Application of support patches, upgrades and installation of add-ons
There are the following reasons that may lead to the termination of this step: TP_INTERFACE_FAILURE: Unable to call tp interface. TP_FAILURE: The tp programme could not be run. For more information, see the SLOG or ALOG log file. CANNOT_IMPORT_DDIC: Unable to import ABAP Dictionary. See the Dictionary Import Log for the cause of the error. AUTO_MOD_SPDD This step checks whether modifications to ABAP Dictionary objects can be adjusted automatically. RUN_SPDD_? This step prompts you to customise your modifications to ABAP Dictionary objects by calling the transaction SPDD.
SAP HANA base administrators can master the database in a way that wasn't possible back then. The SAP database is much more self-healing. Errors do less damage, are easier to detect and fix, and are less likely to impact system performance and availability before they are fixed. Monitoring tools can automatically scan application logs, identify potential errors and even suggest fixes, making it much easier to get to the root of the problem.
These are 10 technology trends every SAP Basis consultant needs to know about
Overall, the application layer is the link between the database layer on the one hand and the presentation layer on the other. Thus, the applications on the application layer request required data from the database in order to process it afterwards.
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
"Shortcut for SAP Systems" makes many tasks in the area of the SAP basis much easier.
Ignore error in SPAM steps If an error is detected in one step, the transaction SPAM stops processing until the error is resolved.
Our approach to using an emergency user concept We have had good experience with the use of the Xiting Authorizations Management Suite (XAMS) in this area.